by The Hon Soli J Sorabjee Attorney General, India
The University of Melbourne - May 22nd 2000

Freedom of the Press was one of the constitutional guarantees
persistently demanded by India's freedom fighters during British
colonial rule. The British masters disdainfully turned down the demand
on the ground that abstract declarations of rights are useless, unless
there exist the will and the means to make them effective.Not
surprisingly after Independence and during the framing of India's
Constitution in the Constituent Assembly, the Founding Fathers
attached great importance to Freedom of the Press. They believed that
central to the concept of a free press is the freedom of political
opinion and at the core of that freedom lies the right to criticise
and censure the government. Surprisingly freedom of the press is not
specifically mentioned in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights in the
Indian Constitution. The omission was noticed and criticised in the
Constituent Assembly. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, the principal architect of
the Constitution, assured the members that freedom of the press was
included in the guarantee of freedom of speech and expression and it
was hardly necessary to provide for it specifically.

This view has been vindicated by the Supreme Court of India. In a
series of decisions from 1950 onwards the Supreme Court has ruled that
Freedom of the Press is implicit in the guarantee of freedom of speech
and expression in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution[1]. Thus
freedom of the press by judicial interpretation has been accorded
constitutional status[2].Ê This is an instance of Constitutional
implication.Ê However there is a strong body of opinion, which favours
specific mention of freedom of the press as a fundamental right. No
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution of India is absolute.
Freedom of the press also can be restricted provided three distinct
and independent prerequisites are satisfied.(1)

The restriction imposed must have the authority of law to support it.
Freedom of the Press, like any other fundamental right, cannot be
curtailed by executive orders or administrative instructions, which
lack the sanction of law.(2)          The law must fall squarely
within one or more heads of permissible restrictions specified in
Article 19(2), namely, (a) security of the State, (b) sovereignty and
integrity of India, (c) friendly relations with foreign States, (d)
public order, (e) decency or morality, (f) contempt of court, (g)
defamation or (h) incitement to an offence[3]. In its landmark
judgment in the case of Sakal Papers[4], the Supreme Court ruled that
it is not open to the State to curtail the freedom of the press for
promoting the general welfare of a section or a group of people unless
its action can be justified by a law strictly falling under clause 2
of Article 19. Freedom of the Press cannot be curtailed on such
omnibus grounds as in the interest of the general public as in the
case of the freedom to carry on trade, business or profession. (3)
    The restriction must be reasonable. In other words, it must not
be excessive or disproportionate. The procedure and the manner of
imposition of the restriction also must be just, fair and

The validity of the restriction is justiciable. Courts in India
exercising the power of judicial review can invalidate laws and
measures which do not satisfy the above requirements, and have done
so.The Indian judiciary has placed a generous construction on the
ambit of freedom of the press and given it a capacious content. It has
ruled that freedom of the press embraces a variety of rights. The
right guaranteed is not merely the individual right of the proprietor
of the newspaper, or the editor or the journalist. It includes the
right to disseminate and import information over the right of citizens
to receive information to read and to be informed.Ê In substance, it
is the right of the people to know.Ê The right to information has been
spelled out by the Supreme Court from the guarantee of free speech in
Article 19(1)(a) in its judgment in S. P. Gupta.[6]

There is no law as yet on Freedom of Information.Ê A Bill is pending
in Parliament.Ê Freedom of the press does not occupy a preferred
position in the Indian Constitution which does not recognise a
hierarchy of rights. Yet there are dicta of the Supreme Court
describing this freedom as "the Ark of the Covenant of Democracy"[7],
ãthe most precious of all the freedoms guaranteed by our
Constitutionä[8].The test adopted by the Supreme Court for determining
whether a particular piece of legislation infringes freedom of the
press is the effect and operation of the legislation. It is not the
object of the law or the form of executive action that determines the
invasion of a fundamental right. The true test is whether the direct
and inevitable effect of the impugned legislation or action is to
abridge freedom of the press.[9]

Hence government's attempt to control the growth and circulation of
newspapers under the garb of distribution of newsprint under a
newsprint policy promulgated under the Import and Export Control Act
was foiled. In its celebrated decision, Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union
of India[10]the Court ruled that a newsprint policy like the one
before the Court was violative of the freedom of the press because it
imposed restrictions which severely constricted newspapers in
adjusting their page number and circulation and also curtailed the
area of advertisement. The Court ruled that loss of advertisements
seriously affects the circulation of a newspaper and a restraint on
advertisements would clearly affect the freedom of the press.An
interesting case arose in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The proprietor
of a Telugu daily, Eenadu, complained that government had withdrawn
advertisements from its paper on account of extraneous reasons, namely
its criticism of the government, and this had adversely affected the
circulation of the paper and its revenue. The action of the government
was challenged. The High Court did not accept the contention that a
newspaper has a constitutional right to obtain advertisements from the
government. It, however, held that the government cannot exercise this
power or privilege ãto favour one set of newspapers or to show its
displeasure against another section of the press. It should not use
the power over such large funds in its hands to muzzle the press, or
as a weapon to punish newspapers which criticise its policies and
actions. It has to use the funds in a reasonable manner consistently
with the object of the advertisement viz. to educate and inform the
public about the activities of the governmentä.[11]The press is not
immune from the ordinary forms of taxation for support of the
government nor from the application of the general laws relating to
industrial relations.[12]

Yet, in another of its celebrated judgment in Indian Express
Newspapers v. Union of India[13] in which a steep customs duty on
newsprint was challenged, the Court observed that the imposition of a
tax such as customs duty on newsprint is an imposition on knowledge
and the Court has to reconcile the social interest involved in the
freedom of the press with the public interest involved in the fiscal
levies imposed by the Government. Therefore in the case of a tax on
newsprint, it may be sufficient to show a distinct and noticeable
burdensomeness clearly and directly attributable to the tax and it is
not necessary to establish that the levy is confiscatory, which would
be the requirement in other cases of taxation.According to the recent
judgment of the Supreme Court commercial speech is within the
guarantee of Article 19(1 )(a) and therefore commercial advertisements
are entitled to constitutional protection.[14]

One of the vexed issues before the Court has been that of censorship
by way of prior restraint.There is no provision in the Indian
Constitution permitting or proscribing censorship. The sting of
censorship lies in prior restraint which affects the heart and soul of
freedom of the press. Expression is snuffed out before its birth. The
communication in question may never see the light of day. Suppression
by a stroke of the pen is more likely to be applied by the censoring
authorities than suppression through a criminal process and thus there
is far less scope for public appraisal and discussion of the matter.
That is the real vice of prior restraint and its irresistible
attraction to the censor.Is prior restraint intrinsically evil? Is it
per se unconstitutional? There is unending debate on this question. In
the Japanese Constitution (Article 21) and the German Constitution
(Article 5) pre-censorship is prohibited. Again the American
Convention on Human Rights (San Jose) 1969 (ACHR) expressly states in
Article 13(2) that freedom of expression "shall not be subject to
prior censorship". There was strong American influence in the drafting
of the Japanese and German Constitutions after World War II. Yet even
in the land of the First Amendment, for which there is more reverence
than to the Ten Commandments, and despite the robust American
tradition and the thrust of US judicial opinion against censorship,
there is no absolute rule against prior restraint. Indeed, its
necessity has been recognised, albeit in exceptional cases, by the
United States Supreme Court in the seminal case of Near v. Minnesota,
the sheet anchor of the opponents of prior restraint. The Court
observed that ãthe protection even as to previous restraint is not
absolutely unlimitedäand listed as exceptions obstructions to
recruitment during war, publication of military movements, obscenity,
ãincitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly
governmentä, and words that "may have all the effect of force".[15]

The Supreme Court of India in May 1950 had to resolve the question in
Brij Bhushan v. The State of Delhi.[16] Section 7(1)(c) of the East
Punjab Safety Act 1949 provided for submission of material for
scrutiny if the government was satisfied that such action was
necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating any activity
prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order. The
Court declared the statutory provision in question unconstitutional on
the ground that the restrictions imposed were outside the purview of
Article 19(2) as it then stood, which did not include public order as
a permissible head of restriction. The Court did not rule that prior
censorship is per se unconstitutional. Indeed, in 1957 the Court
upheld censorship imposed under the Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act
1956 for a temporary period, which provided for a right of
representation to the government.[17] It is noteworthy that another
statutory provision imposing censorship without any time limit and
without providing any right of representation was struck down by the
Court in a judgment delivered on the same day.[18

India's worst brush with censorship occurred during the spurious
emergency declared by the government of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
on 25 June 1975. Censorship of the Press was imposed for the first
time in independent India by the promulgation of a Central Censorship
Order, dated 26 June 1975. No censorship was imposed during two
previous declarations of emergency, in 1962 and in 1971, when the
nation was fighting a war. Under the Indian Constitution during an
emergency, fundamental rights, including freedom of speech and
expression and the freedom of the press, stand suspended. Censorship,
which in normal times would be struck down, becomes immune from
constitutional challenge. Taking advantage of the emergency, numerous
repressive measures were adopted in the form of executive
non-statutory guidelines, and instructions were issued by the censor
to the press. One of the instructions of the censor was that "nothing
is to be published that is likely to convey the impression of a
protest or disapproval of a government measureä.[19]

Consequently anything that smacked of criticism of
governmental measures or action was almost invariably banned, even if
the criticism was sober and moderate. The censor's scissors were
applied arbitrarily and in a few cases its decisions bordered on the
farcical. Quotations from Mahatma Gandhi, Tagore and Nehru were
banned. A statement by the Chairman of the Monopolies and Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission criticising the working of public sector
undertakings was blacked out. Other ludicrous instances are the bans
imposed on news about a member of a former royal family, Begum Vilayat
Mahal, squatting at New Delhi railway station; a report about junior
lawyers marching to the Delhi High Court; a London report of the
arrest of a famous Indian actress for shoplifting; and the news about
a meeting of the Wild Life Board, which considered the grant of a
hunting licence to a certain Maharajahâs brother.[20]

These bans had nothing to do with the security of the State or
preservation of public peace and order but reflected the capricious
working of the censoring authorities.Some of the censorâs directives
were sinister, like the ones prohibiting any reference to the transfer
of State High Court judges, banning publication of judgments of High
Courts which ruled against the censor, "killing" news of the
opposition of certain State governments to proposed constitutional
amendments, banning reports of alleged payoffs made during the
purchase of Boeing aircraft and suppressing criticism of family
planning programs. The object was not merely withholding of
information but manipulation of news and views to legitimise the
emergency and make it acceptable. One tragic consequence was that
inhuman practices like forcible sterilisation of young men after
removing them from buses and other excesses of over-enthusiastic
family planning officials came to light much later after the events,
by which time family planning had become an anathema to the rural
masses. An urgent and important programme suffered a serious setback
owing to suppression of freedom of the press by the censor.
The Indian judiciary, especially the State High Courts, displayed
commendable courage in striking down the censor's orders and upheld
the right of dissent even during the emergency. The High Court of
Bombay in its landmark judgment in Binod Rao v. Masanidelivered on 10
February 1976 declared:

ãIt is not the function of the censor acting under the Censorship
Order to make all newspapers and periodicals trim their sails to one
wind or to tow along in a single file or to speak in chorus with one
voice. It is not for him to exercise his statutory powers to force
public opinion in a single mould or to turn the Press into an
instrument for brainwashing the public. Under the Censorship Order the
censor is appointed the nursemaid of democracy and not its
gravedigger. · Merely because dissent, disapproval or criticism is
expressed in strong language is no ground for banning its publication

The Court, however, cautioned that the voice of dissent cannot take
the form of incitement of revolutionary or subversive activities, for
then instead of serving democracy it would subvert it. The
High Court of Gujarat in its judgment in C. Vaidya v. DâPenha
castigated the censorship directives for imposing upon the people "a
mask of suffocation and strangulation". In construing the expression
"prejudicial report", the Court observed: ãTo peacefully protest
against any governmental action with the immediate object of educating
public opinion and the ultimate object of getting the ruling party
voted out of power at the next general elections is not a prejudicial
report at all. Such a public education is the primary need of every
democracy.ä[22] These judgments were delivered at a time
when "inconvenient" judges during the emergency were transferred from
one State to another in India. Notwithstanding this, the High Courts
rose to the occasion. Indeed it was their finest hour. In
R. Rajagopal v. State of TN[23] the Supreme Court held that neither
the government nor the officials who apprehend that they may be
defamed, had the right to impose a prior restraint upon the
publication of the autobiography of Auto Shankar, a convict serving
sentence of death in jail, which was likely to reveal a nexus between
criminals and high ups in the police.Ê The Court held that ãThe remedy
of public officials/public figures, if any, will arise only after the
publication. ...ä

The Court has however accepted prior restraint in the case of
exhibition of motion pictures because ã.... it has been almost
universally recognised that the treatment of motion pictures must be
different from that of other forms of art and expression. This arises
from the instant appeal of the motion picture ...ä It, however,
emphasised the necessity for a corrective machinery in the shape of an
independent tribunal and also a reasonable time limit for the decision
of the censoring authorities. In laying down certain guidelines for
the censor, the Court was at pains to point out that the "standards
must be so framed that we are not reduced to a level where the
protection of the least capable and the most depraved amongst us
determines what the morally healthy cannot view or read. The standards
that we set for our censors must make a substantial allowance in
favour of freedom."[24]

Courts in India have ruled that in adjudging the question of
proscription of articles in the press or banning the exhibition of a
movie or programs in the TV channels, the standards to be employed
must be of reasonable, strong-minded human beings and not those of
weak and vacillating minds nor of those who scent danger or perceive
hurt and insult in every critical point of view. It is not permissible
to stifle all free expression of opinion by imagining lurking dangers
in every corner and discovering sharp curves and hairpin bends when
all that exists is a straight road. The correct test is: what
impression the article or movie as a whole would produce upon a man of
ordinary commonsense.[25]

Onslaughts on freedom of expression can emanate also from non-State
actors, namely groups or individuals who demand the banning of a book
or a movie which appears offensive or hurtful to them. A determined
effort was made to ban the exhibition of a movie by a group of persons
who regarded its theme and presentation as hostile to the policy of
reservation of jobs in public employment and seats in educational
institutions in favour of Scheduled Castes and backward classes, for
whose benefit special provisions by way of protective or compensatory
discrimination are enacted in the Constitution of India. The Madras
High Court[26] in an incredible judgment revoked the certificate
granted by the Board of Censors permitting exhibition of the film and
restrained its exhibition.

In a path breaking decision the Supreme Court promptly reversed the
High Court judgment.[27]Ê It approved the observations of the European
Court of Human Rights that "freedom of expression protects not merely
ideas that are accepted but those that offend, shock or disturb the
State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of the
pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no
democratic society" [28]. The Court laid down a vital principle in
these words: "If the film is unobjectionable and cannot
constitutionally be restricted under Article 19(2), freedom of
expression cannot be suppressed on account of threats of
demonstrations and processions or threats of violence. That would be
tantamount to negation of the rule of law and surrender to blackmail
and intimidation. Freedom of expression which is legitimate and
constitutionally protected cannot be held to ransom by an intolerant
group of people."[29]

This judgment has far-reaching implications. Its wholesome effect and
timeliness cannot be over-emphasised in view of the rising intolerance
of late witnessed in India. Tranquillity ought not to be maintained in
all cases by sacrifice of liberty. Threats to law and order should be
firmly put down rather than suppress freedom of expression, which it
is the duty of every democratic state to uphold.

ÊDefamation is one of the heads of restrictions specified in the
Constitution. Libel laws can have a chilling effect on freedom of
expression and freedom of the press. The Supreme Court of India in its
judgment in R. Rajagopal v. State of TN[30] broadly approved of the
principles laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in New York Times v.
Sullivan[31] and by the House of Lords in the Derbyshire County
Council[32]and laid down that there is no liability ã... even where
the publication is based upon facts and statements which are not true,
unless the official establishes that the publication was made (by the
defendant) with reckless disregard for truth. In such a case, it would
be enough for the defendant (member of the press or media) to prove
that he acted after a reasonable verification of the facts; it is not
necessary for him to prove that what he has written is true. Of
course, where the publication is proved to be false and actuated by
malice or personal animosity, the defendant would have no defence and
would be liable for damages."[33]Ê The Indian position is more akin to
Theophanus than Lange. Contempt of Court is another permissible head of restriction on freedom of expression and freedom of the Press.Ê The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the Contempt of Courts Act 1952 on the
ground that the Act did not impose unreasonable restrictions on the
right of freedom of speech and is saved under Article 19(2).[34]

Courts have frowned upon comments made in the press upon pending
cases. The Punjab High Court ruled that "liberty of the press is
subordinate to the proper administration of justice. The plain duty of
a journalist is the reporting and not the adjudication of cases."[35]
In the view of the Orissa High Court "the responsibility of the press
is greater than the responsibility of an individual because the press
has a larger audience. The freedom of the press should not degenerate
into a licence to attack litigants and close the door of justice nor
can it include any unrestricted liberty to damage the reputation of
respectable persons.ä[36]

Although the judiciary has provided generous protection to freedom of
the press in several cases, in practice the law of contempt in India
is an instance of the paradox of the love-hate relationship between
the press and the judiciary.In India any person, including the press,
is free to criticise a judgment, to comment on it pungently, severely,
because justice is not a cloistered virtue and can suffer the
outbursts of even the wrong headed. However, it is an altogether
different matter to impute motives to the judges who have delivered
the judgment, to accuse them of dishonesty or their having been swayed
by extraneous considerations.

But what is the position if the charge of judicial corruption happens
to be true and the journalist is prepared to establish it to the hilt
by unimpeachable documentary evidence? Therein lies the rub. Today
under the law of contempt as it stands and has been interpreted in
India truth is no defence to an action for contempt.[37]Ê Indeed if a
person attempts to establish his allegations of dishonesty against a
judicial officer that will be regarded as an aggravation of contempt.

This to my mind is a serious anomaly. Indeed it is highly arguable
that the rejection at the threshold of the plea for establishment of
the truth of the allegations operates as an unreasonable restriction
on the freedom of the press and would render law of contempt
vulnerable to grave constitutional challenge. It prevents exposure of
corruption inter alia in the judiciary which regrettably is prevalent
to some extent in the subordinate courts. Consequently many
journalists and media persons succumb to self censorship and are
deterred from exposing the misconduct of some errant judges. It is a
mistaken notion that an enforced silence by the threatened use of the
contempt power leads to enhancement of the public image of the
judiciary when corruption within some of its ranks is the talk of the
town. A corrupt judge should not get away under the shield of the law
of contempt and thereby successfully suppress disclosure of judicial
misdeeds. The law of contempt in India needs to be amended to provide
the defence of truth coupled with public interest. It may also provide
for imposition of stiff civil and criminal penalties upon a person who
fails to substantiate his allegations. This would discourage frivolous
and baseless allegations being leveled by disgruntled litigants or
persons motivated by ill will.

I would like to conclude with some general observations.Ê We rightly
prize press freedom and should be vigilant in repelling encroachments,
direct or indirect, on the exercise of this precious freedom. Freedom
of the press is undoubtedly one of the basic freedoms in a democratic
society based on the Rule of Law. Nonetheless I venture to suggest
that freedom of the press is not an end in itself.Ê It is the means
for ensuring that in a democratic society there is good governance,
transparency in administration, enforcement of accountability of the
wielders of power and that human dignity and other human rights are
respected. Whilst we must vigorously defend this freedom against
onslaughts from fanatics one should not be fanatical about it and
forget that Freedom of the Press entails abiding social
responsibility. The public function which belongs to the press makes
it an obligation of honour to perform its role with the fullest sense
of responsibility.Ê There is no constitutional right of the press to
defame.Ê The press does not and cannot have a licence to libel.

Joseph Pulitzer has rightly pointed out that ãwithout high ethical
ideals a newspaper not only is stripped of its splendid possibilities
for public service, but may become a positive danger to the
community.ä[38]What is the position, I have often wondered, if a
newspaper systematically and intentionally suppresses or manipulates
information, restricts the content of information and denies its
accessibility to the public, inflames communal and racial passions
which leads to riots and violence? Has it not betrayed its true role,
ceased to be a watchdog and failed to guard the Ark of the Covenant of
democracy? It is suggested in certain quarters that such a newspaper
cannot morally and legitimately lay claim to the protection and
benefit of the constitutional guarantees of free speech though it may
yet claim the fundamental right to carry on trade and business in
which latter case the scope for imposition of restrictions is wider
than in the case of freedom of the press.

The crux of the matter is: Who will determine whether the newspaper in
question has disentitled itself to the guarantee of freedom of the
press? There will be problems. Determination of this question will
lead to the insidious entry of censorship in such situations and that
will pose a greater danger. Therefore rather than encourage such
subversive thoughts, on balance we may console ourselves with the
regret of Madison regarding abuse of press freedom, "that it is better
to leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth,
than, by pruning them away, injure the vigor of those yielding the
proper fruits".[39]

In the ultimate analysis press freedom will depend not so much on the
state of the laws or the provisions of the Constitution but on the
integrity and independence of the press. Lippman has rightly warned
that the real danger to the press springs not so much from the
pressures and intimidation to which it may be subject but from the sad
fact that media persons can be captured and captivated by the company
they keep, their constant exposure to the subtleties of power.
Judicial protection is certainly helpful but that is not the sovereign
panacea. Freedoms cannot be preserved for an inert people by the
Constitution or the Courts. That is true of press freedom also. This
lesson was bitterly brought home during the June 1975 emergency. With
few honourable exceptions, the press chose to crawl when it was
required to bend. However it can be confidently said that apart from
the emergency aberration, the press on the whole has been a good
watchdog. It has played an important and constructive role in India by
exposing deception and secrecy in the working of the administration
and public institutions. Several scams have been brought to light, for
example the Bofors scam, by a vigilant press. Courts in India have
unflinchingly performed their role of enforcing accountability of the
holders of power, checking the virus of corruption and by upholding
the Rule of Law.I do hope and trust that in the coming years these two
mighty institutions of democracy will perform their respective roles
in harmony, as natural allies and not as inveterate adversaries,
remembering that the ultimate goal is of ensuring good governance and
the good life for all its citizens.Ê


[1]  Article 19 (1) All citizens shall have the right - (a) to freedom
of speech and expression.
[2] Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129; Express
Newspapers Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578; Sakal Papers Ltd.
v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 305; Bennett Coleman Co. v. Union of
India, AIR 1973 SC 106
[3Article 19(2) - Nothing in sub-clause (1) shall affect the operation
of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so
far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the
right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the
sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State,
friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or
morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or
incitement to an offence.
[4] Sakal Papers Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 305
[5] Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118 at 119;
State of Madras v. G. Rao, AIR 1952 SC 196 at 199, 200; Tikaramji v.
State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 676 at 711; Express Newspapers,
AIR 1958 SC 578 at 621; State of Bihar v. R.N. Mishra, AIR 1971 SC
[6] AIR 1982 SC 149
[7Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106Ê
[8] Supra f.n. 4, Sakal Papers
[9] Supra f.n. 7, Bennett Coleman, at 119; Maneka Gandhi, AIR 1978 SC
597 at 635
[10] Supra f.n. 7
[11] Ushodaya Publications (P) Ltd. v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, AIR
1981 AP 109
[12] Express Newspapers Ltd., AIR 1958 SC 578
[13] Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 515
[14] Tata Press Ltd. v. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd., 1995 (5) SCC
139 at 154
[15] (1931) 283 US 697
[16] Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129
[17] Virendra Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 896
[18] Ibid, at 903
[19] Sorabjee, Soli J (1977), The Emergency Censorship and the Press
in India 1975-77, Central News Agency (Pvt.) Ltd.. p.13
[20] Ibid, at 31, 27, 29
[21] (1976) 78 Bom. L.R. 125 at 169
[22] C. Vaidya v. D'Penha in Sp. CA 141/1976, 22 March 1976 (unreported)
[23] 1994 (6) SCC 632 at 649
[24] K.A. Abbas v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 481 at 489, 498
[25] Bhagwati Charan v. Provincial Government, AIR 1947 Nag 1; Ramesh
v. Union of India, 1988 (1) SCC 668 at 675; Binod Rao v. Masani,
(1976) 78 Bom. L.R. 125 at 169
[26] Judgment dated 29 April 1988 in WR 469/488 of 1988
[27] S. Rangarajan v. P.J. Ram, 1989 (2) SCR 204
[28] Ibid, at 229, citing Handyside v. United Kingdom, (1976) 1 EHRR 737
[29] Ibid, at 230
[30] Supra f.n. 23
[31] 376 US 254
[32] Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., (1993) AC 534
[33] Supra f.n. 23 at 650
[34] C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta, AIR 1971 SC 1132
[35] Rao Harnarain v. Gumani Ram, AIR 1958 Punjab 273
[36] Bijoyananda v. Bala Krishna, AIR 1953 Orissa 249
[37] Supra f.n. 34, C.K. Daphtary
[38] Gross, Gerald (Ed.) (1966), The Responsibility of the Press,
Clarion Book, New York, page 42
[39] Referred to in Near v. Minnesota, supra f.n. 15, at 718; see also
Romesh Thapar, AIR 1950 SC 124